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Abstract
Motivated by methodological concerns, theoretical considerations, and evidence from previous
studies, this paper makes a contribution to conducting dictator-game experiments under resource
constraints. Using a holistic and strictly controlled approach, we systematically assess the
validity of common cost-saving dictator-game variants. We include five common approaches and
compare them to a standard dictator game: involving fewer receivers than dictators; paying only
some subjects or decisions; role uncertainty at the time of the transfer decision; a combination
of random decision payment and role uncertainty. To test the validity of subjects’ dictator-game
decisions, we relate them to complementary individual difference measures of generosity: social
value orientation, personal values, and a donation to charity. In line with previous evidence,
our data show that dictator behavior is quite sensitive to the applied methods. The standard
version of the dictator game has the highest validity. Involving fewer receivers than dictators
and not paying for all decisions yields comparably valid results. These methods may, therefore,
represent feasible alternatives for the conduct of dictator games under contraints. By contrast, in
the dictator-game variants where only some subjects are paid or where subjects face uncertainty
about their final player role, the expected associations with other measures of generosity are
distorted. Under role uncertainty, generosity is also biased upwards. We conclude that these
methods are inappropriate when the researchers are interested in valid individual measures of
generosity.
Keywords: Dictator Game, Costs, Incentives, Unbalanced Matching, Random Payment, Role
Uncertainty, Social Value Orientation, Personal Values, Donation, Methodology, Experiment
JEL-Classification: C72, C91, D03
PsycINFO-Classification: 2260, 2360, 3020
∗For any inquiry, please contact: Gari Walkowitz, TUM School of Governance, Technical University of Munich,
Richard-Wagner-Straße 1, 80333 Munich, Germany, Tel.: +49-89-907793283, e-mail: gari.walkowitz@tum.de.
1
1 Introduction
The dictator game is a powerful and extensively used paradigm in the social sciences to study social
preferences. It is very popular because of its simplicity.1 The standard version of the dictator game
entails dyads of randomly “one-to-one” matched dictators and receivers. Player roles are previously
allocated by chance. The dictator takes one decision and determines her own payoff – and the
payoff of the matched receiver, who is inactive – by splitting a given prize. Despite the simple
structure of the dictator game, experimenters often face constraints in their research projects which
complicate the implementation of the standard variant of the dictator game: available monetary
funds or laboratory resources are limited; the number of available subjects is restricted (e.g., school
children, managers); the required subjects live in remote areas (e.g., foreign countries, villages) or are
hardly accessible due to legal regulations (e.g., prison inmates, kindergarten children); researchers
need to make within-subject comparisons from multiple decisions (e.g., by contrasting a subject’s
behavior across different games or in different player roles). Besides these constraints, the dictator
game often solely serves as a “companion game” which adds an individual measure of generosity to
the main experimental data.
To handle the above constraints and obtain the aspired data from the experimental subjects,
researchers often modify the standard protocol of the dictator game. There are different approaches:
First, as the receiver is an inactive player, the number of receivers is reduced. An unbalanced
matching is applied such that only some dictators are actually matched with receivers (e.g., Houser
and Schunk, 2009)2. Second, only some players are paid after the dictators have taken a decision
(e.g., Dufwenberg and Muren, 2006; Holm and Engseld, 2005; Kahneman et al., 1986). Third, the
dictator game is repeated or the subjects make several similarly structured decisions, including a
dictator-game transfer, either in separate games or by applying the strategy method (Selten, 1967).
For the subjects’ payoff determination, one decision is randomly chosen and paid out (e.g., Ashraf
et al., 2006; Cappelen et al., 2007; Eckel and Grossman, 2000; Rankin, 2006). Fourth, introducing
role uncertainty, all available subjects first take a decision in the role of the dictator. Afterwards,
actual player roles are randomly assigned, the determined dictators are randomly matched with the
receivers, and the players are paid accordingly (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and
Strobel, 2004; see also Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2011). Many studies also combine random payment of
decisions and role uncertainty to obtain a maximum amount of data and to enable within-subject
comparisons. In this case, the subjects take several decisions as dictators. Afterwards, the payoff-
determining decision is randomly chosen, actual player roles are randomly assigned, and players are
randomly matched and paid out (e.g., Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Ashraf et al., 2006; Blanco
et al., 2011; Castillo and Cross, 2008; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004).
Fifth, some economic studies (but usually psychological ones) do not offer the participants monetary
incentives and let the subjects take hypothetical decisions (Ben-Ner et al., 2008; Bühren and Kundt,
2015; Dalbert and Umlauft, 2009; Lönnqvist et al., 2011).
The above approaches all implement different variants of the dictator game. A randomization
procedure is applied – either with regard to the final matching of the players, how many players
1For an excellent metastudy on the empirical evidence from dictator-game experiments, see Engel (2011).
2These authors do it for practical reasons, but do not reveal this to their subjects. This can be considered a
borderline case of deception. This method is also often used in social psychology experiments. There, the receivers
do often not exist at all (e.g., Batson et al., 1997, admitted on p. 1339). Subjects are typically not aware of this fact.
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are actually paid, the determination of the payoff-relevant decision, or the assignment of actual
player roles. The different randomization procedures yield different probabilities for how strongly
a dictator’s decision eventually determines her own payoff and that of a matched receiver. At the
same time, fewer resources (receivers, sessions, money, etc.) are required and the experiment can be
implemented without inadequate deception (e.g., Ortmann and Hertwig, 2002).
In this paper, we systematically investigate the impact of probabilistic incentives in dictator
games – induced by the different forms of randomization found in the experimental literature. Using
a holistic and strictly controlled approach, we study the important question whether the source
of randomization, i.e., unbalanced matching of dictators and receivers, random payment of players
and decisions, and role uncertainty, alters generosity and underlying motivations. Furthermore,
we examine how the degree of randomization, i.e., single (e.g., in case of unbalanced matching) and
multiple randomizations (e.g., in a situation with random payment of decisions and role uncertainty),
interfere with dictator behavior.
Our study is inspired by methodological and practical considerations, in conjunction with mixed
results from previous studies. For example, in his metastudy on individual dictator-game behavior,
Engel (2011) finds that the less a dictator is sure that her intended generosity affects the receiver,
the less she transfers to the receiver. Moreover, when only some decisions of a dictator, or some
dictators, are paid at random, no significant effect on generosity is detected (see also Bolle, 1990,
and Laury, 2005). Engel (2011) generally uses metaregressions. However, when applying individual
data or when making different specifications in his models, the results differ (p. 591). Referring
to the random payment of decisions in their experiment (including a dictator game), Ashraf et al.
(2006) acknowledge: “While we control for design effects to the best of our ability, we cannot exclude
the possibility that our design affects behavior differently than other, more standard, designs” (p.
197). Moreover, while some studies (e.g., Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) suggest that results are
robust towards role uncertainty, Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011), who directly address the impact of
role uncertainty in a modified dictator game, find it to overestimate the prevalence of altruistic
preferences.3 They conclude that “[...] our results definitely warn against the use of role uncertainty
in future experimental designs aiming to identify different motives behind non-selfish behavior” (p.
171). In a similar vein, Charness and Rabin (2002) admit that “Our use of role reversal and multiple
games in sessions may have generated different behavior than had each participant played just one
role in one game” (p. 827). All in all, in the context of specific forms of randomization, it remains
an open question how changing the incentive structure influences generosity and its foundations.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to investigate systematically the different
randomization procedures and their potential influence on dictator-game giving within a cohesive
and controlled experimental approach. Our study adds the following contributions to the literature:
i) We study and compare the impact of unbalanced matching, random payment of players and deci-
sions, and role uncertainty using exactly the same dictator game in all the treatments. ii) As far as
we are aware, the role of unbalanced matching has not been studied so far. Depending on which field
expert is asked, one gets divergent answers about the appropriateness of (secretly) involving fewer
receivers than dictators with regard to deception issues or the validity of the results. iii) We include
a combination of randomly paying decisions and role uncertainty, which is often done when social
3In a related study, Burks et al. (2003) find that playing both roles in a trust game reduces both trust and
reciprocity.
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preferences are elicited. iv) To assess potential differences in the validity of dictator behavior across
treatments, we relate the subjects’ decisions to alternative individual difference measures typically
associated with generosity: social value orientation, personal values, and a donation. From this
perspective, our study also provides potential new insights into previous results on the existing (or
non-existing) associations of generosity with other individual differences measures such as person-
ality. v) The experimental sessions were run under tight control concerning the time schedule, the
recruited subjects’ characteristics, and the subjects’ perception of the experimental tasks.
In line with previous evidence, our data indicate that dictator behavior is quite sensitive to
the specific game situation. The standard version of the dictator game has the highest validity.
Unbalanced matching and random payment of decisions do not significantly change dictator behavior.
The results of dictator games applying these procedures are comparable to the reference (standard)
treatment without randomization. These procedures may therefore represent feasible resource-saving
alternatives for conducting dictator-game studies under constraints. At first sight, random payment
of only some players does not influence the average amount transferred to the receiver. Yet, we
find that the behavior does not sufficiently correlate with complementary measures of generosity.
Furthermore, supporting previously expressed concerns by other experimentalists, role uncertainty
biases transfers upwards and distorts the associations typically found with alternative measures of
generosity.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we describe our experimental setup and the
specific procedures that ensure strict control and comparability of the treatments. We also make
some theoretical considerations about the impact of probabilistic incentives on generosity across
treatments. In Section 3, we present our results by showing the dictators’ transfers and the validity
of the distinct dictator-game decisions with regard to their correlation with alternative generosity
measures. We will also analyze the characteristics of the recruited subjects and their understanding
and perception of the decision situation. In Section 4, we discuss our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Experiment
2.1 Experimental treatments
In all treatments, we study the same dictator game. The dictator determines the allocation of e10
among herself and a receiver by choosing an integer amount x from e0 to e10 to be given to the
receiver. The basic structure of the dictator game is described with the same standard text in the
instructions of all treatments. The treatment variations, i.e., the different randomization procedures,
were made explicit in a separate paragraph of the instructions.4
We implement the different dictator-game randomization procedures in six treatments. We
deliberately exclude purely hypothetical decisions. Paying (at least some) subjects in the laboratory
has become standard in experimental economics. It is argued that monetary incentives ensure that
participants perceive their behavior as relevant, experience real emotions, and take decisions with
real economic consequences (Falk and Heckman, 2009; Smith, 1976).5 In our treatments, we vary
4Instructions were provided in German. Please refer to Appendix A for the original instructions of all treatments
and an English translation.
5For the effects of the presence or absence of monetary incentives on other-regarding behavior in a dictator game,
see Bühren and Kundt (2015).
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Table 1: Experimental Treatments
Treatment Feature Subjects Dictators Receivers Sessions PD PR
N–N
Reference
treatment for all
comparisons.
64 32 32 2 1.00 1.00
N-N/2
There are fewer
receivers than
dictators.
48 32 16 2 1.00 0.50
Pay50
Only 1/2 of the
dictator-receiver
dyads are paid.
64 32 32 2 0.50 0.50
Dec50
Only one out of
two decisions from
one subject is paid.
64 32 32 2 0.50 0.50
Rol50
Uncertainty about
actual player role
during decision.
32 32 0 1 0.50 0.50
DeRo25
Combination of the
features from
Dec50 and Rol50.
32 32 0 1 0.25 0.25
Total: 304 192 112 10
Notes. PD (PR) denotes the probability for a dictator’s decision to be payoff-relevant for the respective dictator (a
randomly regarded receiver) in a specific treatment.
how 1) the dictators and the receivers are matched, 2) the dictator decisions are payoff-relevant for
either player, 3) the player roles are assigned. Table 1 provides an overview for all the treatments. It
depicts their characteristics, the involved players, and the probability for a dictator’s decision to be
payoff-relevant for the respective dictator and for a randomly regarded receiver, respectively, when
a dictator takes her decision in a specific dictator game. The probability depends on the applied
randomization procedure.
i) Treatment N-N (reference treatment): Subjects are first randomly assigned a player role
(dictator or receiver) with a probability of 1/2. After role assignment, there is the same number
N of dictators and receivers. Then, dictators and receivers are randomly matched, resulting in N
dictator-receiver dyads. This implies that the dictators’ decisions determine for certain their own
and the matched receiver’s payoff. Finally, the dictator determines the allocation. All dictator
decisions are paid. N-N represents the most common, but also most demanding, form of dictator-
game implementation. It requires most resources (budget, time, and lab space) and serves as the
“gold standard” for our comparisons.6 Behavior in the standard version of the dictator game has
been shown to relate to behavior in the field (e.g., Barr et al., 2010; Franzen and Pointner, 2013).
ii) Treatment N-N/2 (unbalanced matching): In this treatment, we introduce an unbalanced
matching of dictators and receivers. First, subjects are randomly assigned a player role with a
probability of 2/3 for taking the role of a dictator and with a probability of 1/3 for taking the
role of a receiver. Consequently, there are twice as many dictators than receivers. Next, dictators
6For a general debate on the interpretation of generosity in give-variants of the dictator game, refer to List (2007).
In our experiment, we use the same frame across treatments.
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and receivers are randomly matched, resulting in N/2 actual dictator-receiver dyads. N/2 of the
dictators remain actually unmatched. Dictator decisions determine their own payoffs with certainty.
A receiver’s payoff is determined only with a probability of 1/2 from the perspective of a dictator.
Finally, the dictator determines the allocation. All dictator decisions are paid (at least to the
dictators). The advantage of this treatment is, that compared to N-N, only 1/2 of the receivers are
needed.
iii) Treatment Pay50 (random payment): First, subjects are randomly assigned a player role
(dictator or receiver) with a probability of 1/2. After role assignment, there is the same number
N of dictators and receivers. Then, dictators and receivers are randomly matched, resulting in N
dictator-receiver dyads. Finally, the dictator determines the allocation. For payoff determination,
1/2 of the dictator-receiver groups are randomly determined and paid out. This means that the
dictators’ decisions determine their own and the matched receiver’s payoff with a probability of 1/2.
Pay50 costs less than N-N, because only 1/2 of the subjects (dictator-receiver dyads) are actually
paid.
iv) Treatment Dec50 (random decision): This treatment entails a second dictator-game decision.
First, subjects are randomly assigned a player role with a probability of 1/2. After role assignment,
there is the same amount N of dictators and receivers. Then, dictators and receivers are randomly
matched, resulting in N dictator-receiver dyads. Dictators take the same decision as in N-N twice.
For payoff determination, each decision is chosen with a probability of 1/2 and yields the payoffs
for either player. This means that a dictator’s decision determines her own payoff and the matched
receiver’s payoff with a probability of 1/2. There is no intermediate feedback provided on the
outcome of the first decision.7 Relative to N-N, twice as many observations are collected. Moreover,
the data allow for within-subject comparisons using repeated decisions.
v) Treatment Rol50 (role uncertainty): Here, we implement role uncertainty. First, all subjects
determine the allocation in the role of a dictator. Then, they are randomly assigned their actual
player role with a probability of 1/2. Consequently, there are as many dictators as there are receivers
(N ). Consecutively, dictators and receivers are randomly matched, resulting in N/2 dictator-receiver
dyads. This implies that a subject’s decision determines her own payoff and another subject’s payoff
with a probability of 1/2. Requiring only 1/2 of the subjects relative to N-N, Rol50 generates the
same number of independent dictator observations.
vi) Treatment DeRo25 (random decision and role uncertainty): This treatment combines the
treatments Dec50 (random decision) and Rol50 (role uncertainty). First, all subjects determine
the allocation in two consecutive dictator games as in Dec50. To determine the players’ payoffs,
one of the two decisions is chosen with a probability of 1/2. Then, subjects are randomly assigned
their actual player role with a probability of 1/2. Consequently, there is the same number N of
dictators and receivers. Dictators and receivers are randomly matched, resulting in N dictator-
receiver dyads. The procedure implies that a subject’s decision in one of the two dictator games
determines her own payoff and another subject’s payoff with a probability of 1/4. In contrast to
N-N, this treatment generates twice as many observations and requires only 1/2 of the subjects. It
also permits within-subject comparisons.
7We chose exactly the same dictator-game decision twice in order to study a pure repetition effect. Choosing a
different task would have been arbitrary. As shown later, a good proportion of the subjects actually takes two different
decisions.
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2.2 Experimental procedures
General procedures. The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Re-
search (CLER), located at the University of Cologne. The lab has 32 cubicles, allowing us to include
16 dictator-receiver dyads in the standard version of the dictator game, i.e., N=16. For each treat-
ment, the number of sessions and involved subjects depended on the treatment (see Table 1). We
collected decisions from 32 dictators in each treatment. In total, 304 subjects (192 dictators) par-
ticipated.8 Subjects were recruited via the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and
participated only in one session. After subjects had arrived at the laboratory, they drew a random
code and were seated in separate and opaque cubicles. Subjects were not allowed to communicate.
In case of any question, they had to raise their hand so that the experimenter could come and help.
The experiment started after all subjects had read the instructions on paper, the experimenter had
publicly read through the instructions, and questions regarding the structure of the experiment had
been answered in private. The experiments were conducted on a computer, using the experimental
platform z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and lasted about one hour. After the main experimental task,
subjects were asked to fill in a list of questionnaires with items on their understanding of the exper-
iment (comprehension questions), empirical and normative beliefs, social value orientation, personal
values, personality, willingness to make a donation, and sociodemographic background. Concluding
the session, subjects were compensated individually with a fixed amount of e4 for showing up, along
with the amount that they had earned in the experiment.9
Specific Controls. Due to the nature of the experiment, random treatment assignment was not
possible within experimental sessions. Therefore, we took specific care of the following factors in
order to keep the experimental conditions as constant as possible across treatments and sessions. i)
Schedule: The experimental sessions for the treatments were scheduled on a Tuesday or Wednesday,
between 9:00 a.m. and 12:15 p.m., during the students’ summer term. In the treatments with two
sessions, we placed one session on a Tuesday and the other one on a Wednesday in two different
weeks.10 Further, we scheduled one session at 9 a.m. and one session at 11 a.m.11 Taken togehter,
this ensured no bridging days, and balanced week days and daytime, and a short time span for
conducting the entire experiment. ii) Experimenter : To avoid experimenter effects (e.g., Roth et al.,
1991; Zizzo, 2010), the same experimenter always conducted the experiment applying exactly the
same experimental protocol. Instructions were neutrally written, avoiding terms like “dictator”,
“giving”, or “fair”, because loaded instructions may alter the dictators’ behavior (e.g., Burnham
et al., 2000). iii) Sex: We strictly balanced the sex of the participants, because women typically
transfer more than men in dictator games (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1998) and tend to participate
more often than men in experiments (e.g., Cleave et al., 2013). For this purpose, males and females
were separately invited to the same session. We ensured that 50% of the dictators were female by
preparing different sets of cubicle codes for each sex. iv) Age: Our aim was to restrict the student
sample to participants who were born between 1990 and 1999, yielding a typical age span for the
current student cohort, because age might have a positive effect on transfers (Engel, 2011). v)
Culture: To avoid variance in the subjects’ decisions due to the subjects’ cultural background (e.g.,
8For details on the recruited subjects’ characteristics, refer to Table 2 in subsection 3.1.
9In Appendix B, the different stages of the experiment are depicted. Personality data are not reported in this
paper.
10Dec50 took place only on a Tuesday. Pay50 (which was added later) was played within one week.
11Please refer to Appendix C for the session plan of the experiment.
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Henrich et al., 2005; Chuah et al., 2007), we only invited subjects who indicated German as their
mother tongue, which was used as an indicator for the subjects’ origin. vi) Experience: We restricted
the subject pool to participants who had no previous experience with dictator-game experiments.
Moreover, we aimed to invite only subjects who had not participated more than seven times in
other experiments before.12 This procedure was chosen to enroll subjects who had some experience
with the situation and procedures typically applied in laboratory experiments. On the other hand,
extensive personal experiences may cause the subjects to play interactive games in the lab as if they
have some repetition, and the experimenter may have little to moderate this phenomenon (for a
similar argument, see Levitt and List, 2007; Matthey and Regner, 2013, find that participation in
previous experiments tends to increase the amount subjects allocate to themselves in dictator games).
We also limited the share of business and economic students – the biggest group in our university’s
laboratory subject pool and potentially familiar with the dictator game and less cooperative (Frank
et al., 1993). vii) Laboratory: Finally, we would like to emphasize that our general laboratory setup
(32 opaque cubicles, e4 show-up fee) is comparable to the majority of laboratories in the German
speaking countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland). An inquiry conducted prior to the experiment
(we received 23 responses to 26 inquiries) yielded that, on average, laboratories are equipped with
26 cubicles and pay an average show up fee of e4.20 to their subjects.
2.3 The impact of probabilistic incentives
Assuming self-regarding, purely money-maximizing preferences, dictator transfers would not differ
among the six dictator-game treatments. Dictators would keep the entire endowment for themselves.
Further, according to the invariance hypothesis (Güth et al., 1982; Bolle, 1990), dictators would make
the same decision in each treatment, independently of how their decision converts into actual payoffs.
However, following Camerer (2003), Smith (2010), and Cox (2010), who emphasize that dictator-
game results are quite sensitive to procedural changes, and based on previous results, we consider
two arguments suggesting behavioral differences across treatments.
2.3.1 The probability of being pivotal
First, in his metastudy on giving behavior in dictator games, Engel (2011) finds that the less a
dictator is sure that her intended behavior becomes effective, i.e., determines the payoff of the
receiver, the less she transfers to the receiver. In this case, generosity is less likely to enhance the
receiver’s welfare. Likewise, low transfers are less likely to hurt the receiver (see also Andreoni and
Bernheim, 2009). One possible explanation for this pattern can be derived from the dictator’s social
image concerns: the less effective the dictator’s behavior becomes, the less she needs to care about her
appearance in the eyes of the receiver. An inequity aversion model (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999)
would make the same prediction, because a disutility from advantageous inequality becomes less
likely when the receiver’s payoff is affected only with some probability smaller than one. Following
these results, we expect dictator transfers to decrease, when it becomes less likely that the receiver
is affected by the dictator’s decision (see PR in Table 1).
12At some stage, we also had to invite more experienced subjects in order to fill the experimental sessions.
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2.3.2 Expected payoffs
Second, in their review articles, Camerer et al. (1999) and Engel (2011) show that people are less
generous when playing with higher stakes. Higher stakes are also found to reduce transfers induced
by presentation effects or image concerns. In our experiment, absolute stakes (the endowment) are
held constant. Yet, the likelihood that a dictator can actually affect her own payoff decreases
in most treatments relative to the reference treatment. According to the above results, if the
dictator’s expected payoff becomes smaller, her transfers will increase and she can expose (more)
socially desirable behavior at a lower cost (see PD in Table 1). An inequity aversion model would
predict, ceteris paribus, lower transfers, when the dictator can affect her own payoff only with some
probability, but for sure determines the receiver’s wealth.13
2.3.3 Predictions
To predict behavior for the different variants of the dictator game, we consider a subject deciding
in the role of a dictator at the moment of her decision.14 In the treatment N-N (our reference
treatment), the subject knows that her decision is for sure payoff-relevant for herself and the matched
receiver. In the treatment N-N/2, the dictator’s allocation decision becomes less effective and affects
a randomly regarded receiver only with a probability of 1/2. The impact on her own payoff remains
constant. Therefore, according to the first argument above, we expect the dictators to transfer less
in N-N/2 as compared to N-N. The Fehr-Schmidt model on inequity aversion would predict the
same tendency as the disutility from advantageous inequality becomes less likely.15
In the treatments Pay50, Dec50, and Rol50, the dictator’s decision affects the payoff of a ran-
domly chosen receiver, but also her own payoff, only with a probability of 1/2 due to payment,
decision, or role uncertainty. The dictator’s decision becomes less effective, but her own stake also
becomes relatively smaller compared to N-N.16 Here, the above arguments conflict: on the one hand,
transfers may increase, because presentation effects or image concerns may become more prevalent,
as they are less costly. On the other hand, transfers may decrease, because the dictators need to
care less about their appearance in the eyes of the receiver. When we assume that dictators prefer
to save money over spending money, i.e., that the first argument dominates the second one – as
long as a dictator has some stake (i.e., her decision influences her own payoff to some extent)17, we
expect lower transfers in Pay50, Dec50, and Rol50, respectively, relative to N-N.18 One argument
which supports this assumption is that people tend to be self-servingly biased (e.g., Loewenstein
13The case becomes more complicated when both the dictator’s and the receiver’s payoffs are probabilistic and
when the probablities differ. This is not the case in our experiment.
14For the treatments Rol50 and DeRo25, this implies that the subject will not necessarily be assigned the role of
the dictator for payoff determination afterwards.
15Generally, the model predicts a maximum transfer of x=5. The detailed calculations are displayed in Appendix
D.
16Here, we make the assumption that the source of randomization (either through payment, decision, or role
uncertainty) does not matter for the dictator. We will come back to the plausibility of this assumption in the
discussion section.
17This would not hold for a purely hypothetical decision. There, the probability of a dictator’s decision to become
payoff-relevant for either player drops to zero. The dictator has no stake at all. Hence, based only on the second
argument, hypothetical transfers would be driven by image concerns (towards the receiver and potentially also the
experimenter) and are therefore higher than in N-N.
18Engel (2011) also finds a significant negative effect of random pay if no study dummies are added to his meta-
regression (p. 591). The expectation of lower transfers in Rol50 is corroborated by the result that people tend to act
less pro-socially, when they are forced to take the role of the opposite player (e.g., Burks et al., 2003). By contrast,
Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011), find that pro-social behavior in a dictator game increases with role uncertainty.
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Table 2: Transfers across Treatments
Treatment No. of Decisions AV SD Med Mode Min Max 0 ≥5
N-N 1 1.69 1.97 1 0 0 5 0.47 0.16
N-N/2 1 2.06 2.11 1.5 0 0 7 0.41 0.16
Pay50 1 1.47 1.83 0.5 0 0 5 0.50 0.13
Dec50 1 1.63 1.84 1 0 0 5 0.41 0.16
2 1.81 1.82 1 0 0 5 0.31 0.16
Rol50 1 2.81 2.21 4 0 0 7 0.31 0.28
DeRo25 1 2.63 2.34 3 0 0 10 0.28 0.22
2 2.75 2.46 3 0 0 10 0.28 0.22
All 2.19 2.13 2 0 0 10 0.34 0.18
Notes. AV (SD, Med, Min, Max) denotes Average, Standard deviation, Minimum, Maximum of the transfers.
0 (≥5) denotes the relative frequency of transfers x=0 (x ≥ 5).
et al., 1993), such that they care more for their own than for the payoff of other players.19 For
the treatment DeRo25, the same relation holds regarding the comparison with N-N and relative to
Pay50, Dec50, and Rol50, respectively, because in DeRo25 a dictator affects her own payoff and the
payoff of a randomly chosen receiver only with a probability of 1/4. The Fehr-Schmidt model would
also partly predict lower transfers in Pay50, Dec50, and Rol50, as well as in DeRo25, respectively,
relative to N-N. For β - parameters 0 and 0.25, the model predicts treatment-invariant transfers of
x=0. For β=0.6, dictator transfers are equal to x=5 in the reference treatment N-N, and x=0 in
the other treatments.20
3 Results
We first analyze the transfers across the different treatments and study the specific impact of unbal-
anced matching, random payment, decision uncertainty, and role uncertainty relative to the reference
treatment.
3.1 Transfers
We show a characterization of the dictator transfers in each treatment in Table 2.21 Table 3 de-
picts the results from different statistical tests for each treatment’s comparison with the reference
treatment in Table 4.
Comparing N-N (1.69) with N-N/2 (2.06), Pay50 (1.47), and Dec50 (1.63, 1.81),22 respectively,
we find no evidence that dictator transfers significantly differ. Effect sizes are rather low. Conversely,
19Fehr and Schmidt (1999) make a similar assumption in their model on inequity aversion: A player’s disutility
from disadvantageous inequality is larger than her disutility if the player is better off than another player.
20β=0, 0.25, and 0.6 are parameter values which are typically found in populations (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), but
see also Blanco et al. (2011) for lower values. Lower values would predict no treatment differences.
21Figure 1 in Appendix E shows the distribution of transfers for each treatment.
2234.37% of the dictators made a different transfer in the second game. First and second transfers are very similar
in D50 (p=0.271, Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates, henceforth: FPP).
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Table 3: Statistical Tests
Statistical Test FPT t-test EST Cohen’s d 95% CI
Unbalanced matching
N-N vs. N-N/2 0.498 0.466 0.662 0.184 -1.396, 0.646
Random payment
N-N vs. Pay50 0.695 0.648 0.890 0.115 -.732, 1.170
Random decision
N-N vs. Dec50 : Decision 1 0.952 0.896 0.701 0.033 -.892, 1.017
N-N vs. Dec50 : Decision 2 0.844 0.793 0.499 0.066 -1.074, 0.824
N-N vs. Dec50 : AV (1,2) 0.973 0.947 0.483 0.017 -0.973, 0.911
Role uncertainty
N-N vs. Rol50 0.042 0.036 0.166 0.537 -2.171, -0.079
Random payment & role uncertainty
N-N vs. DeRo25 : Decision 1 0.098 0.088 0.388 0.433 -2.019, 0.144
N-N vs. DeRo25 : Decision 2 0.071 0.062 0.409 0.476 -2.177, 0.053
N-N vs. DeRo25 : AV (1,2) 0.076 0.071 0.389 0.459 -2.089, 0.089
Notes. The table shows the results from statistical tests for the impact of unbalanced matching, random
payment and decision selection, and role uncertainty. FPT (t-test) depicts the p-values from a Fisher-
Pitman permutation tests for two independent samples (independent two-sample t-test). EST shows the
p-values from an Epps-Singleton two-sample test. Cohen’s d displays the effect size for the difference in
means between two treatments. 95% CI provides the 95% confidence interval for the difference in means
from the t-test.
if we contrast dictator transfers from the reference treatment with Rol50 (2.81) and DeRo25 (2.63,
2.75),23 we find them to be significantly higher, but not differently distributed. Effect sizes range
from moderate to strong.
Next, we pool our data for regression analyses. In Table 4, we first assess whether the probability
of a dictator’s decision to be payoff-relevant for herself (PD) and for the receiver (PR) systematically
influences transfers. Model 1 shows that the degree of how much a dictator’s decision can actually
convert into both players’ payoffs has no significant predictive power – as predicted.24 Based on
these results, we estimate a line of new models, where we include dummy variables for unbalanced
matching (coded 1 if N-N/2 ), random payment (coded 1 if Pay50 ), random decision (coded 1 if
Dec50 and DeRo50 ), and role uncertainty (coded 1 if Rol50 and DeRo50 ). Models (2) to (6) in
Table 4 convey that only role uncertainty has a robust and significantly positive impact on dictator
generosity.
2340.62% of the dictators made a different transfer in the second game. First and second transfers are very similar
in DR25 (p=0.531, FPP).
24Our design allows us to compare all treatments with each other. To further show that PD and PR do not
systematically influence transfers across treatments, we run a pooled regression where treatment dummies predict
transfers (see Table 12 in Appendix F). Model 1 replicates our non-parametric findings. A series of adjunct Wald-
tests exemplarily shows that a comparison of the coefficients from Pay50, Dec50, and Rol50 – the treatments where
PD = PR = 0.5 – yields divergent results (Pay50 vs. Dec50 : p=0.582; Pay50 vs. Rol50 : p=0.009; Dec50 vs. Rol50 :
p=0.031).
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Table 4: Pooled Regression Analysis on the Effects of Randomization
Transfer (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PD -0.001
(0.008)
PR -0.010
(0.010)
Unbalanced matching -0.013
(0.405)
0.336
(0.483)
Random payment -0.725**
(0.362)
-0.258
(0.446)
Random decision 0.195
(0.324)
-0.047
(0.370)
Role uncertainty 1.016***
(0.330)
1.047***
(0.370)
Constant 2.711***
(0.422)
2.075***
(0.166)
2.194***
(0.168)
2.008***
(0.184)
1.734***
(0.170)
1.727***
(0.308)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192
Prob > F 0.233 0.975 0.047 0.547 0.002 0.026
R2 0.015 0.000 0.017 0.002 0.053 0.060
Notes. Coefficients from OLS-regression analyses. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance
levels: ∗∗∗ p<.01, ∗∗ p<.05, ∗ p<.1.
3.2 Validity
To asses the validity of the different dictator-game variants further, we now relate dictator transfers
to two individual difference measures: social value orientation (SVO) and personal values. Both
measures are widely used in experimental economics and social psychology and have been shown
to explain individual differences in dictator-game giving (e.g., Cornelissen et al., 2011; Lönnqvist
et al., 2013). The measures were elicited after the main experimental task. The application of both
measures was balanced in each experimental session, i.e., half of the subjects first completed the
SVO measure and half of the subjects started with the values questionnaire.
In the incentivized SVO slider measure (Murphy and Ackermann, 2014), subjects repeatedly
choose between different own/other payoff allocations. The decisions resemble repeated dictator-
game decisions. From the respondents’ aggregated decisions, a SVO angle and a “type” (altruistic,
pro-social, individualistic, and competitive) can be calculated. A higher angle indicates a greater
concern for the welfare of others. We expect the angle to be positively correlated with dictator
transfers.25
In the non-incentivized Personal Values Questionnaire (Schwartz et al., 2012), subjects respond to
57 questions on how similar they consider themselves to a described person. From their responses, the
importance of ten basic values is derived for each individual (Schwartz, 1992). It was important for us
to include a non-incentivized measure of pro-sociality, because incentivized measures are potentially
25It has to be noted here that this well-established measure utilizes random payment and role uncertainty. First,
all subjects take several distribution decisions. For payoff determination, subjects are randomly assigned the role of a
“dictator” or a “receiver”. Dictators and receivers are randomly matched in pairs. In each pair, one dictator decision
is randomly chosen and determines the pair’s payoff.
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Table 5: Correlation of Dictator Transfers with Alternative Measures of Generosity
Measure/Treatment N-N N-N/2 Pay50 Dec50 Rol50 DeRo25
Social Value Orientation 0.669*** 0.670*** 0.608*** 0.723*** 0.272 0.573***
Self-Direction 0.078 -0.028 -0.015 0.068 -0.111 -0.166
Stimulation -0.081 -0.197 -0.046 -0.350** -0.162 -0.232
Hedonism 0.048 -0.144 -0.014 -0.188 -0.468*** -0.174
Achievement -0.360** -0.039 -0.136 -0.173 0.449** 0.220
Power -0.289(∗) -0.158 -0.101 -0.394** -0.220 0.028
Security -0.516*** -0.513*** -0.062 -0.244 -0.275 0.304*
Tradition 0.058 0.030 -0.086 0.074 -0.033 0.195
Conformism 0.108 0.197 0.378** 0.308* 0.167 -0.051
Benevolence 0.163 0.317* 0.275 0.005 0.043 0.034
Universalism 0.407** 0.279 -0.095 0.333* 0.340* -0.083
Self-Transcendence 0.424** 0.421** 0.066 0.256 0.239 -0.104
Self-Enhancement -0.333* -0.056 -0.143 -0.343** 0.137 0.130
Donation 0.454*** 0.429** 0.093 0.319* 0.291 0.116
Notes. Spearman correlation coefficients. In D50 and DeRo25, correlations are calculated with dictators’ average transfers.
Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p<.01, ∗∗ p<.05, ∗ p<.1, (∗) p=.1.
susceptible to spillover effects, i.e., subjects might try to balance behaviors across decisions (hedging
or moral balancing effects, e.g., Merritt et al., 2010). Among the basic values, we expect the
values along the dimensions of Self-Transcendence (consisting of Benevolence and Universalism and
mapping the ability to transcend one’s own interests for the sake of others) and the Self-Enhancement
(consisting of Power and Achievement and mapping the importance of one’s will to pursue one’s own
interests) to be positively (negatively) correlated with the dictators’ generosity.26
Correlations are displayed in Table 5.27 For the SVO angle, we find significant moderate to
high positive correlations with dictator transfer in N-N, N-N/2, Pay50, and Dec50. In DoRe25, the
correlation is positive and moderate. In Rol50, we do not find a positive correlation between the
SVO angle and dictator transfers.
Regarding values, in N-N, N-N/2, and Dec50, we observe the expected positive (negative) correla-
tions between dictator transfers and Self-Transcendence (Self-Enhancement) values. In Pay50, Rol50
and DeRo25, Self-Transcendence and Self-Enhancement values show no significant correlations with
the dictators’ generosity (except for a single correlation with Universalism in Rol50 ). Most of the
relevant correlation coefficients are very small. Interestingly, and contrary to the other treatments,
Achievement and Security values display a moderate and significantly positive correlation in Rol50
(DeRo25 ) with the transfer in the dictator game.
Finally, we relate the subjects’ behavior in the dictator game to a naturally occurring decision
26Please refer to Appendix G for the complete list and a short description of the ten basic values.
27For the treatments Dec50 and DoRe25, we use the dictators’ average transfer – taken from their first and second
dictator-game decision – for the correlations. Separate correlations yield very similar results.
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situation on charitable giving, which creates a – presumably commonly accepted – positive exter-
nality outside the laboratory (this approach is similar to Benz and Meier, 2008). In doing this, we
can assess how dictator-game behavior, as measured in the laboratory in the different treatments,
relates to an external donation to charity. For this purpose, we provided the subjects with the
opportunity to make a donation from their show-up fee in order to support a medical drug program
against Malaria in Kenia run by Unicef.28 Subjects could donate any amount between 0 and 400
Cents (e4; complete show-up fee). In the description of the donation call, we explicitly conveyed
that the donated money would actually be transferred to Unicef and that the subjects could check
the transfer receipt afterward.29
Results can again be inferred from Table 5. We find significant moderate positive correlations in
the treatments N-N, N-N/2, and Dec50. In Pay50, Rol50, and DeRo25, dictator transfers are not
significantly correlated with the amount donated to Unicef.
When we correlate pairwise – separately for dictators and receivers – Self-Transcendence Values,
Self-Enhancement Values, SVO angle, and the donation, respectively, we find them to be significantly
correlated (see Table 12 in Appendix I). Correlation coefficients range from moderate to high. These
results suggest that those variables measure similar constructs and can be applied as additional
controls.
3.3 Controls
As a last step, we run some controls. We look at potential time effects, the characteristics of the
recruited subjects, and how they perceived the decision situation. We also check if the different
treatments evoke different social norms, dictator beliefs on what other dictators do, and what the
receivers expect them to do.
Time effects. The day (Tuesday is coded 1) and the daytime (9 a.m. is coded 1) of the experi-
mental sessions were not significantly correlated with dictator transfers.30
Subjects’ characteristics. Table 2 provides an overview on the characteristics of the recruited
subjects deciding as dictators. The table conveys that we managed to select rather similar subjects
into the different treatments. Sex (50% females) and age (average = 23.30 years) of the dictators
is well-balanced. Further, a high percentage (89.06%) of the subjects was born in Germany (as
described above, all invited subjects had previously indicated German as their mother tongue; this
we took as a proxy for their nationality when we recruited them). Subjects had moderate experience
(on average, 5.64 participations) with previous experiments. Past dictator-game experience was ruled
out by the recruiting software. A share of 69.27% of the subjects majored in a discipline different
from business or economics. From our selection criteria, sex (r=0.177, p=0.014, PBC), experience
with previous experiments (ρ=-0.175, p=0.017, Spearman rank correlation, henceforth: SRC ), and
studying business or economics (r=-0.144, p=0.045, PBC) show a significant single correlation with
the (average) dictator transfer.31
In Table 10 (see Appendix F), we display the results from a multiple regression analysis, where we
28Detailed information on the program can be found here: https://www.unicef.org/health/index_malaria.html.
29The original donation call and the transfer receipts are displayed in Appendix H. The receipt also includes the
donations from the receivers (see Figure 2).
30Day: r=-0.045, p=0.539; daytime: r=0.040, p=0.583, Point biserial correlations (henceforth: PBC).
31The other correlations are: Age: ρ=-0.094, p=0.193, SRC; Born in Germany: r=0.032, p=0.658, PBC.
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Table 6: Dictators’ Characteristics, Comprehension Questions, and Expectations
Treatment Fem Age (SD) Ger Exp Maj PD PR BE BN
N-N 0.50 23.00 (2.87) 0.94 5.03 0.84 1.00 (0.90) 1.00 (0.76) 2.13 4.44
N-N/2 0.50 23.00 (3.32) 0.75 5.06 0.84 1.00 (0.90) 0.75 (0.74) 2.06 3.75
Pay50 0.50 23.44 (3.71) 0.96 7.00 0.44 0.50 (0.56) 0.50 (0.56) 2.09 3.91
Dec50 0.50 23.03 (3.29) 0.94 5.12 0.81 0.50 (0.64) 0.50 (0.63) 1.59 4.28
Rol50 0.50 24.28 (7.00) 0.84 5.63 0.50 0.50 (0.61) 0.50 (0.64) 3.00 4.16
DeRo25 0.50 23.06 (2.49) 0.97 11.65 0.72 0.25 (0.30) 0.25 (0.32) 3.00 4.34
Total: 0.50 23.30 (4.04) 0.89 5.64 0.74
Notes. Fem (Age, SD, Ger, Exp, Maj) denotes the share of females (average age, the standard deviation of dictators’ age,
the share of dictators born in Germany, the number of previous participations in experiments, and the share of dictators
who have a different major subject than Business Administration or Economics). PD (PR) denotes the dictators’ median
(average) estimation of the probability for a dictator’s decision to be payoff-relevant for the respective dictator in a specific
dictator game (the dictators’ median (average) estimation of the probability for a dictator’s decision to be payoff-relevant
for a randomly regarded receiver in a specific dictator game). BE (BN ) denotes the dictators’ empirical expectation
regarding the behavior of the other dictators (the dictators’ expectation regarding what they think the receivers expect
them to transfer). In the treatment Rol50, one subject was 58 years old. When we exclude this subject from the average
age calculation, the average age is 23.19 (SD=3.40). In the treatment DeRo25, two subjects had participated in – curiously
enough – 93 previous experiments. When we exclude these subjects from the average participation calculation, the average
experience in previous experiments is 6.03.
predict dictator transfers depending on a treatments dummy and subjects’ characteristics. The first
model confirms our results from the above non-parametric analyses on dictator generosity. In Model
2, we add the subjects’ characteristics. The results convey that when we add multiple controls, only
age and being a business/economics student is significantly negatively associated with transfers.32
Comprehension questions. To assess whether the dictators had correctly understood our treat-
ment interventions, we asked them after the main experimental task to indicate how likely it is
that their decisions determine their own payoff (see PD in Table 1) and the payoff from a randomly
regarded receiver (see PR in Table 1).33 Overall, the median and average values from the dictators’
answers suggest that they had understood how their decisions affect their own and the receiver’s
payoff. In the latter case, the results are less strong, though.34
Empirical and normative expectations. To examine whether the dictators perceive the decision
situation differently across the treatments with regard to a normative evaluation of their transfers
(see, e.g., Bicchieri, 2006), we asked them to state two beliefs after the main experimental task.
First, we asked them to estimate the average transfer of the other subjects deciding in the dictator
role. Second, we asked them to state their second-order belief on what they should transfer from
the perspective of the receivers.35 Regarding the empirical expectations, we find no evidence that
32The coefficient for Age contrasts with previous results (e.g., Engel, 2011). Yet, the coefficient is very small and
the students are still very young in our sample due to the limitied age span. Our finding for studying business or
economics corroborates the findings from Frank et al. (1993).
33These probabilities are determined by the likelihood (depending on the treatment) that a subject – taking the
decision as a dictator – is actually matched with a receiver, and is actually assigned the role of the dictator (receiver),
and that a specific decision is actually chosen for payment.
34Our conjecture is – since the structure of the games is simple and was carefully explained by the experimenter
– that subjects, instead of not understanding the game, made mistakes in their explicit calculations or did not fully
understand the questions about the game. Support for this conjecture comes from the treatment N-N, which is the
simplest of all. Even there, not all subjects gave the correct answers (i.e., 100%).
35To limit the amount of incentivized tasks, we chose not to reward dictators for accuracy of expectations. The
evidence about whether payment increases accuracy or not is not conclusive. In an extensive study on the relationship
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the dictators have different beliefs in N-N as compared to N-N/2, Pay50, and Dec50.36 In the
treatments R50 and DR25, the dictators expect the other dictators to transfer significantly more
than in N-N (p=0.024; p=0.014, FPT) (see BE in Table 2).37 The normative expectations are very
similar across the treatments. Only in N-N/2, do the dictators believe that they should transfer
somewhat less as compared to N-N (p=0.079, FPT) (see BN in Table 6).38
4 Discussion
We now discuss our findings from the different dictator-game variants with regard to average trans-
fers, their relation to the complementary measures of generosity, and previous findings from the
literature. We have shown that the degree of how much a dictator’s decision can actually convert
into both players’ payoffs has no significant impact on transfers (see, e.g., Model 1 in Table 4). We
will therefore now discuss how the source of randomization affects behavior in order to assess the
suitability of each dictator-game variant as a cost-saving complement to the standard version of the
dictator game.
Reference treatment: In N-N, subjects transfer slightly less to the receivers as compared to what
Engel (2011) reports on average generosity in student samples (24.7%). This might be an artefact of
the methodological heterogeneity in the dictator games this author analyzes, or of the University of
Cologne’s subject pool (for a comparable result, see Camerer, 2003). Most importantly, generosity
in N-N shows the expected correlations with dictators’ social value orientation, personal values, and
the external donation (cf. Cornelissen et al., 2011; Lönnqvist et al., 2013; Benz and Meier, 2008).
In this respect, N-N provides the most convincing results such that the experimenter can indeed
measure what she wants to measure.
Unbalanced Matching: In N-N/2, we find no evidence that the dictators behave differently as
compared to our reference treatment, although the results are less pronounced with regard to their
validity. The dictators seem not to react towards a decrease in the effectivity of their choice con-
cerning the payoff of the receiver. Based on this finding, we do not necessarily want to encourage
experimenters to apply unbalanced matching in order to save resources. But if there are plausible
arguments for using unbalanced dictator-receiver groups in special cases, unbalanced matching may
be a feasible alternative in order to gather the required data (e.g., Houser and Schunk, 2009; see also
Falk and Walkowitz, 2017, for a recent study on prison inmates). With regard to deception, Ortmann
and Hertwig (2002) write that there must be a direct and salient connection between the decisions
taken and the desired monetary outcome in order to secure the interpretability and so the internal
validity of the experiment. In this respect, our results suggest that unbalanced matching can be
made transparent in order to avoid notions of deception.39 We also want to emphasize that N-N/2
is only one possible variant for testing the effects of involving fewer receivers. In principle, only
between beliefs and decisions, Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) conclude that the effects of the belief elicitation
procedure on decisions is mostly insignificant. Gächter and Renner (2010) show, in a public-good-game setting, that
incentives on beliefs strengthen the relationship between beliefs and contributions, but the effect is quite small.
36p=0.927; p=0.996, p=0.129, Fisher-Pitman permutation test for two independent samples, henceforth: FPT.
37p=1.000, FPT.
38The other comparisons yield: N-N vs. Pay50 (Dec50, Rol50, DeRo25 ): p=0.210 (p=0.796, p=0.515, p=0.873),
FPT.
39A discussion of the question whether not making it transparent is actually deceptive is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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two receivers are needed to meet the requirement of a “random” matching of dictators and receivers
without deception. This variant would be the most conservative (and efficient) test for studying the
impact of involving fewer receivers than dictators. We decided to involve twice as many dictators
than receivers to maintain comparable incentives across our treatments. An interesting question for
future research is whether our finding also holds when the number of receivers is further reduced.
Random payment: The results from Pay50 provide an illustrative case for the benefits of not only
considering dictators’ average transfers, but also their underlying motivations. On the one hand,
we find no evidence that the transfers are significantly different from the reference treatment. On
the other hand, we find the transfers in Pay50 to expose insufficient correlations with alternative
measures of generosity. Therefore, if researchers are interested in absolute average levels of generosity
in the subject pool, paying only some subjects might be feasible. Yet, when generosity is tested and
quantified against other competing motives (e.g., efficiency), random payment might be misleading.
Moreover, if the researchers are interested in underlying motivations, or when the dictator game adds
an individual control for altruistic preferences to other experimental data, associations between the
experimental tasks might be biased when subjects are paid randomly.
Our results from Pay50 differ from Sefton (1992) – not with regard to the overall conclusion
about the appropriatenes of random payment, but with regard to average behavior. In his experi-
ment, dictators are significantly more generous in relation to the control treatment without random
payment, when only 25% of the subjects are paid. The differences among his and our results might
be due to the fact that, in our study, we pay more subjects (50% instead of 25%; this is closer to
the reference treatment) and we have higher stakes (e10 to be split instead of $5; people are less
generous when playing with higher stakes; see, e.g., Camerer et al., 1999, and Engel, 2011). Further,
as Table 6 shows, selected subjects in Pay50 have participated in more experiments (7 vs. 5.03 aver-
age participations) and the proportion of non-business/economics students is lower (44% vs. 84%).
The multiple regression analysis in Table 12 (Appendix F) shows that being a business/economics
student indeed negatively correlates with the dictators’ generosity in the whole study sample. Yet,
we find no such significant correlation for the Pay50 sub-sample (ρ=-0.117, p=0.523, SRC). The
same holds for previous experience, which is not significantly correlated with generosity in Pay50
(ρ=-0.286, p=0.119, SRC). Generally, if major subject and experience actually affected the subjects’
preferences, the strength of the correlations with complementary measures of generosity should not
be affected, because the subjects’ preferences are only “shifted”. This is not the case in Pay50,
though.
Random decision: Using the data of Dec50 and a regression analysis where we jointly evaluate
the data of Dec50 and DeRo25 (see Table 4), we can infer that the mere fact that a dictator takes
a second, similarly structured, decision does not significantly influence her behavior. While a good
proportion of the dictators takes a different decision in the second dictator game, we do not find
broad differences with regard to the averages and validity of the exposed behaviors in Dec50 relative
to our reference treatment. Like in N-N/2, the results are less strong, though. The results from
Dec50 suggest that payoff uncertainty, caused by a randomization of the payoff-relevant tasks, does
not sufficiently change dictator behavior. This corroborates previous results on how the elicitation
and payment of multiple choices (e.g., via the strategy method) – without role uncertainty – influence
behavior (Brandts and Charness, 2000; Engel, 2011; Laury, 2005).
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Role uncertainty: In the treatment Rol50, the dictators transfer significantly higher amounts to
the receivers as compared to the reference treatment. The same tendency can be observed in the
treatment DeRo25, which combines decision with role uncertainty (see Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2011,
for a similar finding). Hence, in DeRo25, role uncertainty seems to dominate the effect of random
decision selection. A regression analysis, where we pool the data from both treatments, confirms that
role uncertainty drives up the dictators’ transfers (see Table 4). Inflated generosity may become an
issue when it is tested against other motives (see, however, Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, who state
that, according to their data, role uncertainty does not change the relative importance of inequality
aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences, p. 867). Most importantly, the subjects’ transfers
in Rol50 and DeRo25 do not expose the expected correlations with the implemented individual
difference measures for generosity. By contrast, personal values typically negatively associated with
dictator transfers (Achievement, Security) show significant positive correlations. Moreover, transfers
do not significantly correlate with the outcome of the donation task either (Table 5). Picking up the
above quote from Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011), dictator games with role uncertainty indeed seem
to identify different motives behind observed non-selfish behavior. Therefore, when the dictator
game adds a control for altruistic preferences to other experimental data, associations between the
experimental tasks might be biased. This is of specific interest, because in this case experimenters
typically want to elicit the social preferences from all participants – and a dictator game with role
uncertainty offers a very convenient way for doing so, as the receivers are initially not needed. Taking
our results, one possibility to solve such a challenge is either to let most subjects decide as dictators
and assign only a few subjects the role a receiver. Alternatively, subjects can make a donation to an
external receiver, e.g., a charity (see our results from the reference treatment, or Benz and Meier,
2008, and Falk et al., 2016).
In Rol50, the recruited subjects are somewhat older relative to the reference treatment (due to
an outlier) and the amount of students majoring in business or economics is higher (see Table 2).
Both facts have not driven the transfers upwards, because the corresponding correlation coefficents
are not significant, very small, and partly even negative in R50.40 The same holds for the potential
impact of more experienced subjects in DeRo25 (see Table 2).41 As we have also shown in a multiple
regression (Table 12 in Appendix F), experience has no impact, and age and major subject have a
negative impact on dicator transfers, generally speaking. Therefore, we do not believe that these
variables have pushed the transfers in Rol50 or DeRo25 upwards.
Table 2 and our analyses convey the idea that dictators in Rol50 and DeRo25 have higher
empirical beliefs concerning the transfers of the other dictators relative to N-N and Dec50.42 We also
find that empirical expectations and transfers are highly correlated in all treatments (all ρ>0.354,
p<0.047, SRC). Hence, dictator transfers in Rol50 and DeRo25 relate to what the dictators believe
about the behavior of the other dictators. Contrary to the other treatments, in Rol50 and DeRo25
the behavior of other subjects is potentially payoff-relevant for a subject. Although not strategically
relevant, there is an inter-player dependence and the players may be forced to put themselves into
the shoes of the other player and into either player role. Therefore, transfers might reflect a notion
of empathy or reciprocity toward other players who might affect a subject’s payoff (Batson et al.,
40Age: ρ=0.009, p=0.962, SRC; Major: r=-0.192 , p=0.292, PBC.
41Experience: ρ=-0.062, p=0.751, SRC.
42As shown, normative expectations do not significantly differ across these treatments.
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1988). The results from our correlational analysis above, however, speak against this interpretation.
Alternatively, transfers might entail an element of “wishful” or “fearful” thinking: because subjects
face the threat of ending up as receivers, they evaluate the game outcomes from the receiver’s
perspective. They make a generous transfer and hope that they will be matched with an equally-
minded dictator in case they are actually assigned the receiver role. Testing and disentagling these
alternative explanations is an interesting path for future work. Another important aspect for future
methodological work relates to the fact that our (standard) measure for social value orientation also
comprises uncertainty about the decision-maker’s actual role. Nevertheless, individual SVO angles
are highly positively correlated with dictator generosity in almost all treatments (except Rol50 ) and
with the other social preference measures. Based on our data, but also suporting a line of other
studies which use the technique of random decision payment and role uncertainty (e.g., Charness
and Rabin, 2002), our conjecture, as yet to be verified, is that, if experimental subjects take sufficient
decisions under role uncertainty, the distorting effect of role uncertainty will become smaller.
As a final remark, we initially intended to link our results to the studies cited in the introduction,
which use different forms of randomization. After another careful reading, we realized that this is an
impossible endeavor for at least three reasons: First, dictator transfers in these studies depend on
many treatment interventions that render comparisons very difficult. Second, different randomiza-
tion techniques are combined. Third, average generosity in some cases cannot be calculated based
on the information provided in the papers. However, our attempt underlines the need for a cohesive
study for a better understanding of the impact of the different randomiziation procedures, but also
that further evidence which warrants our findings is needed.
5 Conclusion
Using a holistic approach, the aim of this paper is systematically to assess the validity of common
cost-saving dictator-game variants. Cost-saving is typically achieved through different randomiza-
tion techniques. We use five distinct approaches and compare them to a standard dictator game:
involving fewer receivers than dictators; paying only some subjects or decisions; role uncertainty at
the time of the transfer decision; a combination of random decision payment and role uncertainty.
The experiment is conducted under strict control regarding the time and the subjects’ characteristics.
To test the validity of subjects’ dictator-game decisions, we relate them to complementary individual
difference measures of generosity: social value orientation, personal values, and an external donation
to charity. In line with previous evidence (e.g., Camerer, 2003; Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2011; Sefton,
1992), our data show that dictator behavior is quite sensitive to the applied methods. The standard
version of the dictator game has the highest validity. Involving fewer receivers than dictators and
not paying for all decisions yields comparably valid results. These methods may, therefore, represent
feasible alternatives for the conduct of dictator games under contraints. By contrast, in the dictator-
game variants where only some subjects are paid or where subjects face uncertainty about their final
player role, the expected associations with other measures of generosity are distorted. Under role
uncertainty, generosity is also biased upwards. We conclude that these methods are inappropriate
when the researchers are interested in valid individual measures of generosity.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Experimental Instructions (in German [English])
Preamble (in all treatments)
Instruktionen für das Experiment
Sie nehmen nun an einem wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Entscheidungsexperiment teil. Bitte lesen Sie
sich die Instruktionen für das Experiment sorgfältig durch. Für die gesamte Dauer des Experiments
ist es sehr wichtig, dass Sie nicht mit anderen Experimentsteilnehmern sprechen. Wenn Sie etwas
nicht verstehen sollten, schauen Sie bitte noch einmal in diese Instruktionen. Falls Sie dann noch
Fragen haben, geben Sie uns bitte ein Handzeichen. Wir werden dann zu Ihnen an die Kabinen
kommen und Ihre Fragen persönlich beantworten.
Für Ihr Erscheinen erhalten Sie eine Aufwandsentschädigung in Höhe von 4 €. Im Verlauf des Exper-
iments können Sie Geld hinzuverdienen. Die Höhe Ihres Verdienstes hängt von Ihren Entscheidungen
oder von den Entscheidungen anderer Teilnehmer ab. Sie erfahren zu keinem Zeitpunkt den Na-
men der anderen Teilnehmer. Genauso erfahren die anderen Entscheider zu keinem Zeitpunkt Ihre
Identität.
Alle Daten und Antworten werden anonym ausgewertet. Um Anonymität zu gewährleisten, haben
Sie eine persönliche Kabinennummer gezogen.
Am Ende des Experiments bitten wir Sie, noch ein paar Fragen zu beantworten
Instructions for the experiment.
You are now taking part in an economic decision experiment. Please read the following instructions
for the experiment carefully. Throughout the entire experiment it is very important that you do
not talk to any of the other participants. In case you do not understand something, please read the
corresponding instructions again. If you then still have questions, please raise your hand. We will
come to your cubicle and answer your questions personally. For showing up, you will receive a fixed
amount of 4 €. In this experiment, you can earn additional money. The amount of money you can
earn during the experiment depends on your decisions or on the decisions of other participants.
You are at no point in time informed about the names of the other participants. Likewise, the other
participants do not get to know your identity at any point in time. All data and answers will be
analyzed anonymously. In order to assure anonymity, you have drawn a personal cubicle number.
After the experiment, we will ask you to answer some questions.
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Description of the dictator game (in all treatments)
Experimentsbeschreibung
In diesem Experiment gibt es zwei mögliche Rollen, die Sie als Teilnehmer potentiell haben können:
Person A und Person B. Person A trifft eine für Person A und Person B auszahlungsrelevante
Entscheidung. Person A erhält eine Anfangsausstattung in Höhe von 10 €.
Person A hat nun die Möglichkeit, einen beliebigen Teil dieser Anfangsausstattung an Person B zu
transferieren. Dabei kann Person A nur ganzzahlige Beträge transferieren, d.h. Person A kann nur
eine Zahl aus der Menge {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , 10} wählen.
Person B erhält keine Anfangsausstattung und trifft keine Entscheidung.
Die Auszahlung von Person A bestimmt sich wie folgt:
+ Anfangsausstattung von Person A
- dem von Person A an Person B transferierten Betrag
= Auszahlung von Person A
Die Auszahlung von Person B bestimmt sich wie folgt:
+ der von Person A an Person B transferierte Betrag
= Auszahlung von Person B
Description of the experiment
In this experiment, there are two roles that you can potentially have as a participant: Person A
and Person B. Person A takes a decision which is payoff-relevant for Person A and Person B.
Person A receives an endowment of e10. Person A can transfer any part of the endowment to
Person B. Person A can only transfer integer amounts, i.e., Person A can only choose numbers
from {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , 10}. Person B receives no endowment and makes no decision. The payoffs
are calculated as follows: The payoff of Person A is determined by: + Endowment of Person A -
Transfer from Person A to Person B = Payoff of Person A. The payoff of Person B is determined
by: + Transfer from Person A to Person B = Payoff of Person B.
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Treatment N-N (Reference Treatment)
Bitte beachten Sie:
Jedem Teilnehmer wird zunächst zufällig die Rolle von Person A oder die Rolle von Person B
zugeordnet.
Nach der Zuordnung hat genau die Hälfte der Teilnehmer die Rolle von Person A. Die andere Hälfte
der Teilnehmer hat die Rolle von Person B.
Jeder Person A wird zufällig eine Person B zugeordnet.
Person A trifft die beschriebene Entscheidung einmal.
Die Auszahlung einer Person A hängt von ihrer eigenen Entscheidung ab.
Die Auszahlung einer Person B hängt jeweils von der Entscheidung von Person A innerhalb einer
Zuordnung ab.
Please note: Every participant is first randomly assigned the role of Person A or the role of Person
B. After the assignment, exactly half of the participants have the role of Person A. The other half
of the participants have the role of Person B. Every Person A is randomly matched with a Person
B. Person A makes the described decision once. The payoff of a Person A depends on her own
decision. The payoff of a Person B depends on the decision of Person A within a matching group,
respectively.
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Treatment N-N/2 (Unbalanced Matching)
Bitte beachten Sie:
Jedem Teilnehmer wird zunächst zufällig die Rolle von Person A oder die Rolle von Person B
zugeordnet.
Nach der Zuordnung haben genau 2/3 der Teilnehmer die Rolle von Person A. 1/3 der Teilnehmer
hat die Rolle von Person B.
Jeder Person A wird zufällig mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% eine Person B zugeordnet.
Person A trifft die beschriebene Entscheidung einmal.
Die Auszahlung einer Person A hängt von ihrer eigenen Entscheidung ab. Dies gilt auch für den
Fall, wenn Person A keine Person B tatsächlich zugeordnet wurde.
Die Auszahlung einer Person B hängt jeweils von der Entscheidung von Person A innerhalb einer
Zuordnung ab.
Please note: Every participant is first randomly assigned the role of Person A or the role of Person
B. After the assignment, exactly 2/3 of the participants have the role of Person A. 1/3 of the
participants have the role of Person B. Every Person A is randomly matched, with a probability
of 50%, with a Person B. Person A makes the described decision once. The payoff of a Person A
depends on her own decision. This also holds if Person A is not actually matched with a Person B.
The payoff of a Person B depends on the decision of Person A within a matching group, respectively.
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Treatment Pay50 (Random Payment)
Bitte beachten Sie:
Jedem Teilnehmer wird zunächst zufällig die Rolle von Person A oder die Rolle von Person B
zugeordnet.
Nach der Zuordnung hat genau die Hälfte der Teilnehmer die Rolle von Person A. Die andere Hälfte
der Teilnehmer hat die Rolle von Person B.
Jeder Person A wird zufällig eine Person B zugeordnet.
Person A trifft die beschriebene Entscheidung einmal.
Nach der Entscheidung von Person A werden 50% der Zuordnungen von Person A und Person B
zufällig ausgewählt. Diese werden dann tatsächlich, jeweils in Abhängigkeit von der Entscheidung
von Person A innerhalb einer Zuordnung, ausgezahlt. Die anderen 50% der Zuordnungen werden
nicht tatsächlich ausgezahlt.
Die tatsächliche Auszahlung einer Person A hängt somit von ihrer eigenen Entscheidung ab und
davon, ob ihre Zuordnung für die Auszahlung zufällig ausgewählt wurde.
Die tatsächliche Auszahlung einer Person B hängt jeweils von der Entscheidung von Person A in-
nerhalb einer Zuordnung ab, und davon, ob ihre Zuordnung für die Auszahlung zufällig ausgewählt
wurde.
Please note: Every participant is first randomly assigned the role of Person A or the role of Person
B. After the assignment, exactly half of the participants have the role of Person A. The other
half of the participants have the role of Person B. Every Person A is randomly matched with a
Person B. Person A makes the described decision once. The payoff of a Person A depends on her
own decision. The payoff of a Person B depends on the decision of Person A within a matching
group, respectively. After the decision of Person A, 50% of the Person A-Person B matching
groups are randomly chosen. They are actually paid out, depending on the decision of Person A
within a matching group, respectively. The other 50% of the matching groups are not actually paid
out. Therefore, the actual payoff of a Person A depends on her own decision and on whether her
matching group was randomly chosen, respectively. The actual payoff of a Person B depends on
the decision of Person A and on whether her matching group was randomly chosen, respectively.
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Treatment Dec50 (Random Decision)
Bitte beachten Sie:
Jedem Teilnehmer wird zunächst zufällig die Rolle von Person A oder die Rolle von Person B
zugeordnet
Nach der Zuordnung hat genau die Hälfte der Teilnehmer die Rolle von Person A. Die andere Hälfte
der Teilnehmer hat die Rolle von Person B.
Jeder Person A wird zufällig eine Person B zugeordnet.
Person A trifft die beschriebene Entscheidung zweimal.
Bei der zweiten Entscheidung bleiben die Rollen und die Zuordnung der Teilnehmer dieselben.
Es wird eine Entscheidung von Person A mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50 % gewählt, welche die
Auszahlungen von Person A und Person B bestimmt.
Die Auszahlung einer Person A hängt jeweils mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% von ihrer ersten
oder von ihrer zweiten Entscheidung ab.
Die Auszahlung einer Person B hängt jeweils mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% von der ersten
oder von der zweiten Entscheidung von Person A innerhalb einer Zuordnung ab.
Please note: Every participant is first randomly assigned the role of Person A or the role of Person
B. After the assignment, exactly half of the participants have the role of Person A. The other
half of the participants have the role of Person B. Every Person A is randomly matched with a
Person B. Person A makes the described decision twice. For the second decision, the participants’
roles and the matching of Person A and Person B remain the same. One decision of Person A is
randomly chosen with a probability of 50% and determines the payoffs. The payoff of a Person A
depends, with a probability of 50%, on her first or on her second decision, respectively. The payoff
of a Person B depends, with a probability of 50%, on the first or on the second decision of Person
A within a matching group, respectively.
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Treatment Rol50 (Role Uncertainty)
Bitte beachten Sie:
Jeder Teilnehmer entscheidet zunächst in der Rolle von Person A.
Jeder Teilnehmer trifft die beschriebene Entscheidung einmal.
Danach wird jedem Teilnehmer zufällig die Rolle von Person A oder die Rolle von Person B zuge-
ordnet.
Nach der Zuordnung hat genau die Hälfte der Teilnehmer tatsächlich die Rolle von Person A. Die
andere Hälfte der Teilnehmer hat die Rolle von Person B.
Jeder Person A wird zufällig eine Person B zugeordnet.
Die Auszahlung einer Person A hängt von ihrer Entscheidung, die sie als Person A getroffen hat, ab.
Die Auszahlung einer Person B hängt jeweils von der Entscheidung von Person A innerhalb einer
Zuordnung ab.
Please note: Every participant first takes a decision in the role of Person A. Every participant
makes the described decision once. Then, every participant is randomly assigned the role of Person
A or the role of Person B. After the assignment, exactly half of the participants have the role of
Person A. The other half of the participants have the role of Person B. Every Person A is randomly
matched with a Person B. The payoff of a Person A depends on the decision she has taken in the
role of Person A. The payoff of a Person B depends on the decision of Person A within a matching
group, respectively.
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Treatment DeRo25 (Random Decision and Role Uncertainty)
Bitte beachten Sie: Jeder Teilnehmer entscheidet zunächst in der Rolle von Person A.
Person A trifft die beschriebene Entscheidung zweimal. Danach wird jedem Teilnehmer zufällig die
Rolle von Person A oder die Rolle von Person B zugeordnet.
Nach der Zuordnung hat genau die Hälfte der Teilnehmer tatsächlich die Rolle von Person A. Die
andere Hälfte der Teilnehmer hat tatsächlich die Rolle von Person B.
Jeder Person A wird zufällig eine Person B zugeordnet.
Es wird eine Entscheidung von Person A mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50 % gewählt, welche die
Auszahlungen von Person A und Person B bestimmt.
Die Auszahlung einer Person A hängt jeweils mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% von ihrer ersten
oder von ihrer zweiten Entscheidung ab.
Die Auszahlung einer Person B hängt jeweils mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% von der ersten
oder von der zweiten Entscheidung von Person A innerhalb einer Zuordnung ab.
Please note: Every participant first takes a decision in the role of Person A. Every participant
makes the described decision twice. Then, every participant is randomly assigned the role of Person
A or the role of Person B. After the assignment, exactly half of the participants have the role of
Person A. The other half of the participants have the role of Person B. Every Person A is randomly
matched with a Person B. One decision of Person A is randomly chosen with a probability of 50%
and determines the payoffs. The payoff of a Person A depends, with a probability of 50%, on her
first or on her second decision, respectively. The payoff of a Person B depends, with a probability
of 50%, on the first or on the second decision of Person A within a matching group, respectively.
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Appendix B: Stages of the Experiment
Table 7: Stages of the Experiment
1. Introduction
2. Dictator Game(s): N-N, N-N/2, Pay50, Dec50, Rol50, DeRo25
3. Comprehension questions
4. Empirical and normative Beliefs
5a. Social Value Orientation 5b. Personal Values Questionnaire
6a. Personal Values Questionnaire 6b. Social Values Orientation
7. Big 5 Personality Questionnaire (data not reported here)
8. Donation Task
9. Sociodemographics Questionnaire
10. Payout
Notes. In the stages 5 and 6, half of the subjects first completed the SVO measure (a) and
half of the subjects (b) started with the values questionnaire.
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Appendix C: Session Plan
Table 8: Session Plan
Session No. Week Date Day Time Treatment
1 1 May 23, 2017 Tuesday 9:00 - 10:15 N-N
2 1 May 23, 2017 Tuesday 11:00 - 12:15 Dec50
3 1 May 24, 2017 Wednesday 9:00 - 10:15 N-N/2
4 1 May 24, 2017 Wednesday 11:00 - 12:15 DeRo25
5 2 May 30, 2017 Tuesday 9:00 - 10:15 Dec50
6 2 May 30, 2017 Tuesday 11:00 - 12:15 N-N/2
7 2 May 31, 2017 Wednesday 9:00 - 10:15 Rol50
8 2 May 31, 2017 Wednesday 11:00 - 12:15 N-N
9 3 July 25, 2017 Tuesday 9:00 - 10:15 Pay50
10 3 July 26, 2017 Wednesday 11:00 - 12:15 Pay50
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Appendix D: Fehr-Schmidt Predictions
Table 9: Fehr-Schmidt Predictions
x PD PD · (10 - x) PR β xi - xj PR · β · (xi - xj) UD(x)
Treatment: N-N
0 1 10 1 0.6 10 6 4
1 1 9 1 0.6 8 4.8 4.2
2 1 8 1 0.6 6 3.6. 4.4
3 1 7 1 0.6 4 2.4 4.6
4 1 6 1 0.6 2 1.2 4.8
5 1 5 1 0.6 0 0 5*
Treatment: N-N/2
0 1 10 0.5 0.6 10 3 7*
1 1 9 0.5 0.6 8 2.4 6.6
2 1 8 0.5 0.6 6 1.8 6.2
3 1 7 0.5 0.6 4 1.2 5.8
4 1 6 0.5 0.6 2 0.6 5.4
5 1 5 0.5 0.6 0 0 5
Treatment: Pay50, Dec50, Rol50
0 0.5 5 0.5 0.6 5 1 3.5*
1 0.5 4.5 0.5 0.6 3.5 1.05 3.45
2 0.5 4 0.5 0.6 2 0.6 3.4
3 0.5 3.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.15 3.35
Treatment: DeRo25
0 0.25 2.5 0.25 0.6 2.5 0.375 2.125*
1 0.25 2.25 0.25 0.6 1.25 0.1875 2.0625
2 0.25 2 0.25 0.6 0 0 2
Notes. x=dictator transfer, PD (PR) is the probability for a dictator’s decision to affect the payoff
of the respective dictator in a specific dictator game (the probability for a dictator’s decision to
affect the payoff of a randomly regarded receiver in a specific dictator game), β is the inequity
aversion parameter of the dictator, xi (xj) is the payoff of the dictator (receiver). * marks the
optimal choice for the dictator, i.e., the transfer that generates the highest utility UD(x).
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Appendix E: Distribution of Transfers
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Figure 1: Transfers across Treatments
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Appendix F: Multiple Regressions on Transfers
Table 10: Metaregressions on Transfers
Transfer (1) (2)
N-N/2 0.375
(0.511)
0.416
(0.494)
Pay50 -0.219
(0.476)
0.194
(0.487)
Dec50 0.031
(0.471)
0.059
(0.444)
Rol50 1.125**
(0.523)
1.679***
(0.515)
DeRo25 1.000*
(0.544)
0.936(∗)
(0.571)
Female 0.486
(0.331)
Age -0.070**
(0.028)
German 0.215
(0.447)
Experience -0.022
(0.027)
Business/Economics -0.718**
(0.338)
Constant 1.688***
(0.349)
3.082***
(0.931)
Observations 192 192
Prob > F 0.049 0.000
R2 0.060 0.137
Notes. Coefficients from OLS-regression analyses. The ref-
erence category is N-N. Robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses. In the lower panel of the table, the p-values of
Wald tests are depicted. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p<.01, ∗∗
p<.05, ∗ p<.1., (∗) p=.1.
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Appendix G: Schwartz Values
Table 11: The Ten Basic Personal Values
Value Description
Self-direction Independent thought and action – choosing, creating, exploring
Stimulation Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself
Achievement Personal success through demonstrating competence according
to social standards
Power Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and
resources
Security Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of
self
Tradition Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas
that traditional culture or religion provides
Conformity Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or
harm others and violate social expectations or norms
Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with
whom one is in frequent personal contact
Universalism Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the
welfare of all people and for nature
Self-Transcendence Transcending one’s own interests for the sake of others
(calculated by the mean of Benevolence and Universalism
Values)
Self-Enhancement Pursuing one’s own interests (calculated by the mean of
Achievement and Power Values)
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Appendix H: Donation Task
Description of the task
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an diesem Experiment.
Für Ihre Teilnahme erhalten Sie wie immer einen Festbetrag in Höhe von 4 Euro (=400 Cent).
Trotz vieler Fortschritte im Kampf gegen Malaria sterben weltweit jährlich noch immer 800.000
Kinder an den Folgen. Typische Symptome für Malaria sind Kopfschmerzen, Erschöpfung und
Muskelschmerzen. Wiederkehrende heftige Fieberanfälle können tödlich sein. Malaria ist jedoch
heilbar. Doch nur jedes dritte erkrankte Kind erhält rechtzeitig Medikamente, die dafür notwendig
wären. Moderne ACT-Kombinationspräparate helfen gegen die gefürchtete Fieberkrankheit. Ein an
Malaria erkranktes Kind erhält sie zweimal täglich, etwa drei Tage lang. Im Kampf gegen Malaria
können auch kleine Spenden hilfreich sein und viel bewirken. (Auskunft laut Webseite von UNICEF).
Sie können nun bestimmen, ob und wie viel Sie zur Unterstützung von UNICEF spenden wollen. Sie
können diese Entscheidung vollkommen frei und anonym treffen. Der Betrag, den Sie spenden, wird
dafür verwendet werden, Malaria-Medikamente für Kinder zu kaufen, damit diese damit behandelt
und geheilt werden können. Mit Ihrer Spende können Sie daher helfen, Kinder vor Malaria zu
schützen. Ihr Spendenbetrag wird nach Beendigung der Studie durch die Studienleiter für den Kauf
von Malariamedikamenten für Kinder gespendet. Die Belege dafür können auf Nachfrage bei den
Studienleitern eingesehen werden.
Ich möchte gern folgenden Betrag an UNICEF spenden (bitte tragen Sie hier einen Wert zwischen
0 und 400 Cent ein):
Thank you for your participation in this experiment.
As always, you will receive a fixed amount of 4 Euro (= 400 cents) for your participation. In spite
of the many advances in the fight against malaria, 800,000 children worldwide still die from its
consequences every year. Typical symptoms of malaria are headache, fatigue, and muscle pain.
Recurring violent fever attacks can be fatal. Malaria is, however, curable. But only one out of
every three sick children receives necessary medication in time. Modern ACT combination drugs
help against the fevered febrile disease. A child suffering from malaria receives it twice daily,
for about three days. In the fight against malaria, small donations can also be helpful and have
a significant impact (according to the UNICEF website). You can now determine if, and how
much, you want to donate to support UNICEF. You can make this decision completely freely and
anonymously. The amount you donate will be used to buy malaria drugs for children so that they
can be treated and cured. With your donation, you can help protect children from malaria. Your
donation amount will be donated by the experimenters after completion of the study for the purchase
of malaria drugs for children. The receipts can be viewed on request by the study directors. I would
like to donate the following amount to UNICEF (please enter an amount between 0 and 400 cents):
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Payment receipt (first wave)
Figure 2: Donation Receipt for Dictators and Receivers (first Wave)
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Payment receipt (second wave)
Figure 3: Donation Receipt for Dictators and Receivers (second Wave)
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Appendix I: Correlations of Complementary Generosity Measures
Table 12: Correlations of Complementary Generosity Measures
Correlation Dictators (n=192) Receivers (n=112)
Self-Transcendence Values and SVO angle 0.289*** 0.344***
Self-Enhancement Values and SVO angle -0.224*** -0.218**
Self-Transcendence Values and donation 0.216*** 0.223**
Self-Enhancement Values and donation -0.116 -0.254***
Self-Transcendence Values and Self-Enhancement Values -0.554*** -0.562***
SVO angle and donation 0.321*** 0.504***
Notes. Spearman correlation coefficients. SVO=Social Value Orientation. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p<.01, ∗∗ p<.05, ∗ p<.1
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